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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Gracie Jean Tryon appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding her 
guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of 
drug paraphernalia.                     
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
The following facts are based on testimony presented at Tryon’s jury trial on the charges 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (See R., pp.18-19.) 
Detective Matt Richardson testified that, before recently joining the Nampa Police 
Department, he had been a detective in the Caldwell Police Department’s “Street Crimes Unit” 
for three years.  (Tr., p.127, L.9 – p.128, L.5; p.129, L.25 – p.130, L.3.)  The Street Crimes Unit 
is a proactive unit that “seeks out street level drug traffickers and gang members.”  (Tr., p.128, 
Ls.14-18.)  While in the Street Crimes Unit, Detective Richardson investigated offenses 
involving methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, pills, and cocaine.  (Tr., p.130, Ls.7-12.) 
Detective Richardson has had specialized training in four different interdiction courses 
and “went through” the DEA narcotics school.  (Tr., p.129, Ls.1-4.)  In his drug interdiction 
training, Detective Richardson was taught to identify people and vehicles that travel across state 
lines with narcotics, and the DEA school trained him in long-term drug investigations, mainly 
dealing with undercover and confidential informant operations.  (Tr., p.129, Ls.10-16.) 
Detective Richardson had dealt with methamphetamine “almost on a weekly basis” 
during his three years in the Street Crimes Unit, and worked on about 100 cases involving the 
seizure of methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.130, L.24 – p.131, L.18.)  He testified that he is familiar 
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with (1) how methamphetamine looks (white crystallized substance, small crystals and some 
powder), (2) what it smells like (little odor to it), (3) how it is packaged (large sandwich baggies, 
smaller zip-lock baggies, and “tear-offs” of plastic shopping bags that are melted at the end), (4) 
how it is typically ingested (smoking by using glass tubes with a ball on one end, injecting, or 
snorting), and that (5) used methamphetamine pipes have white residue inside and could also be 
black on the bottom of the ball.   (Tr., p.168, L.6 - p.171, L.6.)  The detective explained that 
marijuana has a unique smell that he can recognize, and that marijuana is generally smoked using 
a glass pipe, but can also be smoked with an E-cigarette.  (Tr., p.171, L.15 – p.172, L.12.)   
On the night of February 1, 2016, Detective Richardson was in the area of a residence in 
Caldwell, watching it to see if there was any drug activity.  (Tr., p.173, Ls.6-11; p.174, L.8 - 
p.175, L.5.)  The detective had been at the house on four previous occasions to assist in 
misdemeanor probation office visits, and he had encountered drugs and drug paraphernalia at 
that house.  (Tr., p.175, Ls.9-20.)  While observing the house, Detective Richardson saw a Ford 
truck that was parked on the street leave, so he followed it.  (Tr., p.176, Ls. 1-18.)  After 
watching the truck fail to make a complete stop at two stop signs, the detective pulled the truck 
over.  (Tr., p.176, L.15 – p.178, L.13.)  The driver of the truck was Carl Ringcamp, and Tryon, 
the only passenger, informed the detective that she and Ringcamp were boyfriend and girlfriend.  
(Tr., p.178, L.14 - p.180, L.7.)  
When he went to the truck, Detective Richardson noticed a faint odor of marijuana 
coming from it, and had Ringcamp go to the rear of the truck to speak to him.  (Tr., p.180, Ls.8-
16.)  Based on their conversation, the detective placed Ringcamp into custody and put him into 
his patrol vehicle.  (Tr., p.180, L.22 – p.181, L.6.)  When Tryon got out of the truck from the 
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passenger side, Detective Richardson “overheard her say that she’s not going to allow us[1] to 
search her purse.”  (Tr., p.181, L.19 – p.182, L.1.)  Detective Richardson talked to Tryon about a 
marijuana pipe that Ringcamp had left on the seat, and she admitted it was a “weed pipe” and 
that she had it in her pocket.  (Tr., p.182, L.7 – p.183, L.4.)  The detective retrieved that pipe,  
which was a “long cylinder pipe or E-cigarette,” from Tryon’s pocket.  (Tr., p.187, L.22 – p.189, 
L.9.)  
Detective Richardson searched the truck and found (1) a small coin purse with stems and 
bits of black residue located in the passenger side door panel (2) a large ladies purse that was 
open and packed full of items, which sat on the passenger side floorboard, (3) a black case that 
sat on top of everything in the open purse, (4) two hypodermic syringes and two glass pipes in a 
purple Crown Royal bag that was inside the black case; one of the pipes had white residue in its 
burnt bottom, and (5) a small blue plastic case next to the Crown Royal bag that held a baggie 
with a white crystallized substance.  (Tr., p.183, L.16 – p.185, L.22; p.206, Ls.14-16; p.213, L.17 
– p.214, L.14.)   
According to Detective Richardson, 75 to 80 percent of the time when he finds 
methamphetamine during an investigation, he also finds syringes or pipes, and here, the 
syringes/pipes and the white crystalline substance were “right next to each other.”  (Tr., p.191, 
L.10 – p.192, L.3.)  When asked, “Is the substance – the white crystalline substance that we 
previously mentioned, does that look akin to methamphetamine?” the detective answered “Yes.” 
(Tr., p.193, L.25 – p.196, L.5.)  On re-direct examination, Detective Richardson testified that the 
white crystalline substance does not look like “kosher salt,” but that it does look like 
methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.232, L.21 – p.233, L.1.)  
                                            
1  Another officer arrived at the scene after Detective Richardson initially made the traffic stop.  
(Tr., p.181, Ls.9-18.) 
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Over an objection by Tryon (based on hearsay and the right to confrontation) and after an 
offer of proof by the state outside the presence of the jury (see generally Tr., p.148, L.16 – p.166, 
L.19), the trial court permitted Detective Richardson to testify about statements made Ringcamp 
when he was in the back seat of the patrol car.  The detective first testified, “I asked him whose 
meth it was and he stated it wasn’t hers.”  (Tr., p.194, Ls.10-19.)  The detective further testified 
that Ringcamp gave a couple other responses; “He again said it wasn’t hers.  And then, he later 
said, “It was mine.  Okay.”2  (Tr., p.195, Ls.13-17.) 
The state charged Tryon with unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.18-19.)  Tryon pled not guilty 
and proceeded to trial at which a jury found her guilty of both charges.  (R., pp.66-67.)  The 
district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with one and one-half years fixed, and 
suspended the sentence and placed Tryon on probation for three years.  (R., pp.88-91.)  Tryon 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.81-84.)   
                                            
2  The state did not call a forensic scientist as a witness, or introduce a lab report, to prove that 
the white crystalline substance was methamphetamine.  Instead, the state presented 
circumstantial evidence to show that the substance was methamphetamine. See State v. Mitchell, 
130 Idaho 134, 136, 937 P.2d 960, 962 (Ct. App. 1997).    
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ISSUES 
 
 Tryon states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it permitted the admission of Mr. 
Ringcamp’s statements, because that violated Ms. Tryon’s constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against her? 
 
2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance? 
 
 (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Tryon failed to show any error in the district court’s admission of Ringcamp’s 
statements because:  (a) she waived any objection to their admission by telling the jury in her 
opening statement that Ringcamp told the officers, “it was mine, Okay,” and (b) she failed to 
show that Ringcamp’s statements were “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?   
 
2. Has Tryon failed to show the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
 
Tryon Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Admission Of Ringcamp’s 
Statements Because (1) She Waived Any Objection By Telling The Jury About The Statements 
During Opening Statement, And (2) The Statements Were Not Testimonial For Purposes Of The 
Confrontation Clause 
 
A. Introduction  
 
 Tryon contends the district court violated her constitutional right to confront witnesses 
“when it permitted the admission, through Detective Richardson,[3] of Mr. Ringcamp’s 
statements touching on the identity of the substance at issue.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)   Tryon 
argues that the admission of such testimony constitutes reversible error.4  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.16-17.)  Tryon’s arguments fail. 
 First, Tryon waived any objection to Ringcamp’s testimony because, prior to any 
argument or ruling on its admissibility, her trial counsel informed the jury during opening 
statement that Ringcamp told the officers “The evidence will show that Carl later took – later 
told the officers, ‘it was mine. Okay.”’  (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-4.)  Moreover, the district court 
correctly determined that admission of Ringcamp’s statement did not violate Tryon’s right to 
confrontation because the statement was not “testimonial” under the Confrontation Clause.  
                                            
3  Tryon argues, in effect, that because Ringcamp did not correct Detective Richardson’s 
reference to “methamphetamine,” he made an adoptive admission that the substance was 
methamphetamine.  At trial, the state used Ringcamp’s non-objection to the detective’s 
“methamphetamine” reference as one of the circumstances that showed the substance was 
methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.155, L.12 – p.156, Ls. 12-24; p.158, L.15 – p.159, L.1; p.194, L.13 – 
p.195, L.17; p.289, Ls.8-17; p.328, L.24 – p.329, L.18.)     
 
4  Tryon does not challenge the district court’s determination that the statement Ringcamp made 
in response to Detective Richardson’s question -- in which he took responsibility for the 
“methamphetamine” seized from Tryon’s purse – constituted a statement against interest, or that 
Ringcamp was “unavailable” for trial.  (Tr., p.166, Ls.12-19); see I.R.E. 804(b)(3).   
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Finally, even if this Court finds that Tryon has met her burden of showing error in relation to the 
admission of the challenged testimony, any error is harmless.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the appellate court 
defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but gives free review to the 
trial court’s legal determinations.  State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141, 176 P.3d 911, 913 
(2007). 
 
C. Tryon Waived Any Objection To The Admission Of Ringcamp’s Statements  
 Prior to jury selection on the day trial began, the prosecutor informed the court that he 
had one additional motion:  he intended to call Officer Richardson to testify that Ringcamp told 
him the “meth” belonged to him, and the state anticipated “a hearsay objection and a 
confrontation clause objection.”  (Tr., p.24, L.12 – p.25, L.3.)  The court decided that it would be 
better to consider the matter when they reached “that point” in the trial and to “take it up outside 
the presence of the jury[,]” allowing the state to “make an offer of proof and whatever argument 
they may have.”  (Tr., p.25, Ls.15-20.)   During his opening statement – before any argument or 
ruling had been made regarding the admissibility of Ringcamp’s statements – Tryon’s trial 
counsel told the jury, “The evidence will show that Carl later took – later told the officers, ‘it was 
mine.  Okay.’”  (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-4.) 
 When the issue of the admissibility of Ringcamp’s statements arose during the state’s 
case-in-chief, the prosecutor stated: 
  
 Your Honor, we intend to ask the officer about statements made by Carl 
Ringcamp, the statements referenced by Mr. Smethers [defense counsel] in his 
opening.  Mr. Ringcamp was asked something along the lines of, whose 
methamphetamine is it.  He says. “it’s mine.”  Number one, we think that defense 
counsel putting that statement in his opening is a waiver of his hearsay objection 
and also his confrontation clause objection.  You simply can’t reference a 
statement in whole or in part in your opening and then complain about it being 
admitted later. 
8 
 
(Tr., p.148, L.20 – p.149, L.6 (explanation added).)  Although the district court rejected Tryon’s 
confrontation clause argument (Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15), it did not make any ruling in regard to the 
prosecutor’s “waiver” argument.   
  
 However, the prosecutor was correct -- the doctrine of invited error estops a party from 
asserting an error when his own conduct induced the commission of the error.  State v. Atkinson, 
124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993).  A party may not complain of errors he 
has consented to or acquiesced in.  State v. Caudhill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 
(1985); see State v. Lankford, 35617, 2017 WL 2838135, at *16 (Idaho July 3, 2017) (Defense 
counsel’s opening statement challenging the veracity of the state’s witnesses allowed the 
prosecutor to tell jury during closing argument that the state had presented witnesses who were 
good and honest people.).  By telling the jury that “[t]he evidence will show that Carl . . . later 
told the officers, ‘it was mine.  Okay’” (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-4), Tryon waived any argument that her 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the subsequent admission of such 
testimony.  Although the district court did not make a ruling on whether Tryon had waived her 
confrontation clause issue, the court’s ruling admitting Ringcamp’s statements should be 
affirmed on this alternative basis.  See State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court’s ruling must be upheld if it is capable of 
being upheld on any theory).    
 
D. The District Court Correctly Determined That Admission Of Ringcamp’s Statement Did 
Not Violate Tryon’s Right To Confrontation Because It Was Not “Testimonial”   
 1. Factual Background  
 During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, when the trial judge asked why 
Ringcamp’s statement was “nontestimonial” for purposes of a confrontation clause analysis, the 
prosecutor explained: 
9 
 
I think the definition of testimonial is a statement made by the declarant where he 
could reasonably expect the statement would be used by the State to accuse a 
criminal defendant of a crime.  I don’t think anyone at the time would have 
possibly guessed that the statement, “that’s my meth,” which is made purely to 
exculpate this particular defendant, would be used later to prove that it was meth.  
I don’t think that is a thought that went through his head.  I don’t think that’s a 
thought that any reasonable person would have went through his head.     
 
 The reason you, when stopped with your girlfriend, tell an officer, “that’s 
my meth,” is to get her out of trouble, not to get her into trouble.  
 
(Tr., p.155, L.19 – p.156, L.3.) 
 Toward the end of the hearing, the district court stated that, similar to a statement at issue 
in United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2009), the challenged statement in Tryon’s 
case was nontestimonial and presented no “confrontation” issue.  (Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15.)  The 
court asked for an offer of proof “as to exactly what – what the statement was and how it 
occurred.”  (Tr., p.160, Ls.16-18.)  Detective Richardson testified that when he asked Ringcamp 
“whose meth it was,”5 Ringcamp first said “it wasn’t hers[,]” then he “told [the detective] it was 
his.”  (Tr., p.161, Ls.4-10.)  When the detective resumed his testimony before the jury, he 
testified that, while Ringcamp was in the back of his detective car, “I asked him whose meth it 
was and he stated it wasn’t hers,” and Ringcamp “again said it wasn’t hers.  And then, he later 
said, ‘It was mine.  Okay.’”  (Tr., p.194, Ls.17-19; p.195, Ls.16-17.)   
 Relying mainly on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Tryon argues 
on appeal that because Detective Richardson’s testimony about Ringcamp’s statements was 
presented as an adoptive admission to help prove that the white crystalline substance seized from 
the Crown Royal bag was methamphetamine, it violated her confrontation rights because 
Ringcamp was not available for cross-examination at trial, nor had she been given a prior 
                                            
5  On cross-examination during the hearing on the “confrontation” issue, Detective Richardson 
affirmed that he used “the exact verbiage whose meth is this.”  (Tr., p.162, Ls.11-13.) 
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opportunity to cross-examine him.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-15.)  Tryon’s argument fails.  
Correct application of the law to the facts of this case supports the district court’s determination 
that the challenged statements were not testimonial, and, therefore, their admission did not 
violate Tryon’s confrontation rights.   
  
 2. Legal Standards Applicable To The Confrontation Clause  
 In Ohio v. Clark, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179-2180 (2015), the Supreme Court set out the 
general landscape of Confrontation Clause law, which, although lengthy, warrants review: 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which is binding on the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 . . . (1980), we interpreted the Clause to 
permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness, so long 
as the statements bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”  Such indicia are present, 
we held, if “the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Ibid. 
  
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 . . . (2004), we adopted a different 
approach.  We explained that “witnesses,” under the Confrontation Clause, are 
those “who bear testimony,” and we defined “testimony” as “a solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id., at 
51 . . . (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  The Sixth Amendment, 
we concluded, prohibits the introduction of testimonial statements by a 
nontestifying witness, unless the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  Id., at 54 . . . .  
Applying that definition to the facts in Crawford, we held that statements by a 
witness during police questioning at the station house were testimonial and thus 
could not be admitted.  But our decision in Crawford did not offer an exhaustive 
definition of “testimonial” statements.  Instead, Crawford stated that the label 
“applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id., at 68 . . . . 
  
Our more recent cases have labored to flesh out what it means for a statement to 
be “testimonial.”  In Davis v. Washington [6] and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 
813 . . . (2006), which we decided together, we dealt with statements given to law 
enforcement officers by the victims of domestic abuse.  The victim in Davis made 
statements to a 911 emergency operator during and shortly after her boyfriend’s 
                                            
6  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006). 
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violent attack.  In Hammon, the victim, after being isolated from her abusive 
husband, made statements to police that were memorialized in a “‘battery 
affidavit.’”  Id., at 820 . . . . 
  
We held that the statements in Hammon were testimonial, while the statements in 
Davis were not.  Announcing what has come to be known as the “primary 
purpose” test, we explained: “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”  Id., at 822 . . . .  Because the cases involved statements to 
law enforcement officers, we reserved the question whether similar statements to 
individuals other than law enforcement officers would raise similar issues under 
the Confrontation Clause. See id., at 823, n. 2 . . . .  
  
In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 . . . (2011), we further expounded on the 
primary purpose test.  The inquiry, we emphasized, must consider “all of the 
relevant circumstances.”  Id., at 369 . . . .  And we reiterated our view in Davis 
that, when “the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an ‘ongoing 
emergency,’ its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the 
scope of the [Confrontation] Clause.”  562 U.S., at 358 . . . .  At the same time, we 
noted that “there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, 
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.”  Ibid.  “[T]he existence vel non of an ongoing 
emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.”  Id., at 374 . . . .  
Instead, “whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor . . . that 
informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.”  
Id., at 366 . . . . 
  
One additional factor is “the informality of the situation and the interrogation.”  
Id., at 377 . . . .  A “formal station-house interrogation,” like the questioning in 
Crawford, is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal 
questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining 
testimonial evidence against the accused.  Id., at 366, 377 . . . .  And in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial, “standard rules of hearsay, 
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”  Id., at 358–
359 . . . .  In the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, 
viewed objectively, the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to “creat[e] an 
out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”  Id., at 358 . . . .  Applying these 
principles in Bryant, we held that the statements made by a dying victim about his 
assailant were not testimonial because the circumstances objectively indicated 
that the conversation was primarily aimed at quelling an ongoing emergency, not 
establishing evidence for the prosecution.  Because the relevant statements were 
made to law enforcement officers, we again declined to decide whether the same 
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analysis applies to statements made to individuals other than the police.  See id., 
at 357, n. 3 . . . . 
  
Thus, under our precedents, a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation 
Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial.  “Where no such primary 
purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal 
rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.”  Id., at 359 . . . .  
 
 
3. Tryon’s Statement Was Not “Testimonial” Because It Was Not Made For The 
Primary Purpose Of Creating Evidence For Trial   
 
 Tryon argues that, “much like the testimony of the analysts in Melendez-Diaz, which 
proved the substance was cocaine, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were against Ms. Tryon, helping 
to prove one fact necessary for her conviction – that the substance was methamphetamine.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  Tryon’s argument misses the main point in determining whether 
Ringcamp’s statement is testimonial under the Confrontation Clause – whether the “primary 
purpose of the interrogation” was to create or develop evidence for a later trial.     
 In State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 347 P.3d 175 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court 
reviewed several United States Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases pertaining to forensic 
reports, including Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).7  According to 
Stanfield, in Melendez-Diaz “the trial court admitted three ‘certificates of analysis’ that cocaine 
was present in the bags of powder seized from the defendant.  The certificates were sworn to 
before a notary by the analysts who conducted the testing.”  Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 333, 347 
                                            
7 In Stanfield, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the Confrontation Clause was not 
violated by a neuropathologist’s expert testimony that the child-victim died from “non-accidental 
head trauma resulting from abuse,” which testimony was based on a non-testifying lab 
technician’s assertions that slides of brain tissue of the child (1) were labeled correctly, and (2) 
had the proper stain applied to samples in accordance with protocol, “thereby permitting an 
accurate interpretation of the samples.”  Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 330, 339, 347 P.3d at 178, 187.  
Stanfield held “that there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the technician’s 
assertions were not made for an evidentiary purpose and thus were not testimonial.  Id., at 340, 
347 P.3d at 188.   
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P.3d at 181.  Addressing the “formality” requirement for a statement to be deemed “testimonial” 
under the Confrontation Clause, the United States Supreme Court concluded that “the certificates 
were testimonial because they were ‘solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact” and were “quite plainly affidavits.”  Id. (quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310).  In addressing the second requirement for being “testimonial” 
– the “primary purpose of the interrogation” -- Melendez-Diaz “noted that the governing statute 
provided that ‘the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the 
composition, quality, and net weight of the analyzed substance.’”  Id. (emphasis original) 
(quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311).            
 Tryon correctly notes that the state’s use of Ringcamp’s statement to help prove that the 
white crystalline substance found in her purse was methamphetamine bears some similarity to 
the admission in Melendez-Diaz of sworn “certificates of analysis” by state lab analysts to prove 
the substance analyzed was cocaine.  However, Stanfield pointed out that, in Melendez-Diaz, the 
statements (i.e. reports by non-testifying analysts) were not only made “‘for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact at trial,’” Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 335, 347 P.3d at 183 (quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324), but under Massachusetts law, ‘“the sole purpose of the 
affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the 
analyzed substance,’” id. at 333, 347 P.3d at 181 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311) 
(emphasis original).  
 In contrast to the sworn certificates of analysis in Melendez-Diaz that had the sole 
purpose of being generated for admission into evidence, an objective review of the statements at 
issue in this case shows they were not elicited or made for the “primary purpose” of creating an 
“out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358.  As stated by the 
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prosecutor, “I don’t think anyone at the time would have possibly guessed that the statement, 
‘that’s my meth,’ which is made purely to exculpate this particular defendant, would be used 
later to prove that it was meth.”  (Tr., p.155, Ls.16-21.)  Stated in legal terms, “the primary 
purpose of the interrogation,” whether viewed from Detective Richardson’s question, 
Ringcamp’s answer, or both, was not to create a record for trial, or an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony, in order to prove that the substance found in Tryon’s purse was, in fact, 
methamphetamine.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (“primary purpose of an 
interrogation”), 369 (“In determining whether a declarant’s statements ae testimonial, courts 
should look to all of the relevant circumstances”); Ohio v. Clark, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179-2180 
(2015) (“primary purpose of the interrogation”); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) 
(same).   
 In sum, because no reasonable person would have expected that Ringcamp’s answer to 
Detective Richardson’s question (whose meth is this?) would later be used as a substitute for 
testimony by a forensic scientist, such future use was not, under any objective evaluation, the 
“primary purpose of the interrogation.”8  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359 (“We objectively evaluate 
the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.”); 
Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 337, 347 P.3d at 185 (“The only consistent requirement that can be 
distilled from these decisions is that in order for a statement – forensic or otherwise – to be 
deemed testimonial, it must have been made with a primary objective of creating an evidentiary 
record to establish or prove a fact at trial.”).   Therefore, the district court correctly concluded 
                                            
8  During a discussion between the trial judge and counsel at the bench, held outside the hearing 
of the jury, when it became clear that the state was not going to present testimony by a “lab 
witness,” Tryon’s trial counsel exclaimed, “If they don’t have a lab witness here, I don’t know 
what the hell we’re doing here.”  (Tr., p.133, L.25 – p.134, L.2.) 
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that Ringcamp’s statement was not “testimonial” under the Confrontation Clause, and properly 
admitted it.   
 
E. Any Error Is Harmless 
 A trial error can be declared harmless if the appellate court concludes on de novo review 
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  To 
show harmless error the state has “the burden of showing that it was clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.”  Premo v. 
Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 130 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).  Where the error placed 
impermissible evidence, argument or information before the jury the Supreme Court has required 
the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
conviction.  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (admission of confession that should have been 
suppressed); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-96 (1991) (argument for guilt from 
defendant’s silence); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (visible shackles without cause 
at jury trial).  An “otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may 
confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  In conjunction with the 
review of the whole record, review of the strength of the state’s evidence is appropriate.  Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1999); see also Premo, 562 U.S. at 129-31.  The analysis 
ultimately focuses “on the underlying fairness of the trial.”  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-19.  
 At trial, the state presented circumstantial evidence to show that the white crystalline 
substance seized from Tryon’s purse was methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.133, Ls.2-24; p.147, Ls.2-9; 
p.166, Ls.9-12; p.193, Ls.10-11; p.236, L.11 – p.238, L.24.)  In doing so, the state relied on State 
v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 136, 937 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct. App. 1997), which held “that 
-- --- -----
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circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove the identity of a substance where laboratory 
analysis is not available.”9  Due to the strength of the circumstantial evidence showing that the 
white crystalline substance found in Tryon’s purse was methamphetamine, even if this Court 
finds error in the admission of Ringcamp’s statements, it should conclude that, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the statements did not contribute to the verdict.  
 Detective Richardson was highly trained and experienced in investigating 
methamphetamine crimes (including its appearance, smell, packaging (here: the corner of a small 
baggie which was melted closed), and means of ingestion (here: two pipes – one with tell-tale 
white burnt residue -- and two syringes).  Moreover, Tryon’s statement that she was not going to 
allow the officers to search her purse shows there was something more legally jeopardizing in 
her purse than marijuana -- since the marijuana pipe had already been taken from Tryon’s 
person.  Finally, the close proximity of the white crystalline substance to the two glass pipes and 
two syringes in Tryon’s purse supports the only reasonable conclusion possible, that the 
substance found in Tryon’s purse was methamphetamine.  
 For its response to Tryon’s “harmless error” argument (see Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-17), 
the state fully relies on its “Statement of Facts,” pages 1 through 3 in this brief, and incorporated 
herein.  Based on those facts, which were established through trial testimony, this Court should 
find that, beyond a reasonable doubt, any error in the admission of Ringcamp’s statement did not 
contribute to Tryon’s conviction and is, therefore, harmless.  See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.   
 
  
                                            
9  The state is unable to ascertain from the record why a “laboratory analysis” expert was not 
available for trial in this case. 
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II. 
Tryon Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support Her Conviction For 
Unlawful Possession Of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) 
 
A. Introduction 
 After the state rested its case, Tryon’s trial counsel made a motion to dismiss the case 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, which was denied.10  (Tr., p.234, L.3 – p.242, L.2.)  On 
appeal, Tryon again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-
22.)  Specifically, she contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that “the substance at issue” -- the white crystalline 
substance found in the Crown Royal bag in her purse -- “was methamphetamine.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.18.)  Tryon’s argument fails.  Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
                                            
10  The district court ruled: 
 
 The test of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence on such a motion 
is whether there is substantial evidence upon which rational triers of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  That’s state versus Barlow, 
113 Idaho 573 [746 P.2d 1032 (Ct. App. 1987)].  As noted by Mr. Spalding [the 
prosecutor], the Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the State, recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the 
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded 
evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence.  
In cases where the inculpatory evidence is so insubstantial that jurors could not 
help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element, judgment of 
acquittal should be entered. 
 
 In this case, I do not believe, at the close of the State's case in applying the 
view of the evidence that I'm required to do, I don't believe that a judgment of 
acquittal is appropriate.  I will deny that motion, finding that the State's evidence 
is not so insubstantial that jurors could not help but have a reasonable doubt as to 
the proof of that -- of any elements.  And I think there are two elements in doubt 
in this, one, the possession, and two, the substance.  So I will deny that motion for 
judgment of acquittal without prejudice to being renewed at a later time. 
 
(Tr., p.240, L.24 - p.242, L.2 (bracketed material added).) 
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presented shows the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Tryon 
was guilty of unlawfully possessing methamphetamine.  Tryon has failed to show she is entitled 
to an acquittal on that charge.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict 
if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).  In 
conducting this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence.  State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991);  
Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.  Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from 
those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.  State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential Elements Of Unlawful 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) 
 
 Tryon argues that the state failed to present substantial evidence upon which a rational 
trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the white crystalline substance 
seized from her purse was, in fact, methamphetamine.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-22.)  Tryon 
compares the very strong, but non-scientific, evidence presented in State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 
134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), with the evidence in her case, and concludes that the 
evidence presented here was not sufficient to prove the substance was methamphetamine.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.20-22.)  However, Mitchell did not establish the threshold that must be 
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met in order to determine whether the state has presented substantial evidence of the nature of a 
controlled substance in the absence of forensic analysis and testimony.   
 For its response to Tryon’s “insufficient evidence” argument (see Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.18-22), the state fully relies on its “Statement of Facts,” pages 1 through 3 in this brief, and 
incorporated herein.  In making a “sufficiency of the evidence” determination, this Court 
considers all of the evidence presented to the jury – including the evidence Tryon claims was 
erroneously admitted.  See State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
 Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the state provided substantial 
evidence upon which a rational trial of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
white crystalline substance found in Tryon’s purse was methamphetamine.  Therefore, Tryon has 
failed to show that her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) was not supported by sufficient evidence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding Tron guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
  DATED this 25th day of August, 2017. 
              
      _/s/ John C. McKinney___________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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